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Manchuria

THE MANCHURIA-HUNGER

OF THE

EAST ASIATIC "BOCHES"

By

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Sometime Chinese Diplomatic Service

Amidst the cyclonic storm of death and devastation that has swept over us in the Yangtse Valley and beyond, when the Occidental Christendom has been actively giving relief and succor to the Chinese people as much as possible, our eastern neighbor, Japan, has "fulfilled her treaty obligations" to us by watching indifferently, if not egging on underhandedly, her Korean subjects destroy our citizens' lives in Korea to the number of 119 killed, 375 injured and 82 missing, with property destruction estimated at 2,750,000 yen (Minister Wang Yung-pao's Report). So far Japan has asserted that she cannot be held liable for such killings and damages, rejecting our indemnity claim and our demand for apologies.

Even early in July this year the press and news agencies of the world began to "vitaphone" Japan's grumbles about our having foiled and checkmated her attempts of exploitation in our Manchuria, officially styled "the Three Eastern Provinces." The grumbles soon swelled into snarls and growls; and both Japanese and Occidental press frankly gave voice to Japan's threat of some "positive or strong measures" against us. Are we too wide of the mark if we say this Chinese massacre in Korea is but a straw that shows which way the wind blows?

Japan's decision to return to her Tanaka's policy, to her "oldtime militaristic diplomacy" (humorously, as "the sword-rattling policy in China"), in Manchuria at least, was all at once evidenced by her Hunnish or Vandalic *coup de main* in the night of September 18th. With no notice given us at all, she, as befits the common run of brigands and marauders, swooped upon Mukden, the Capital-city of the three provinces, fired on it and seized it in a trice! After this, declares our Nanking Government's note to the Government of the United States,

> "our cities and towns have been occupied, and in certain cases ransacked; our public officers and innocent citizens have been injured, insulted and murdered. . . . Chinese passenger trains carrying refugees on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway were attacked by bombs and machine-gun fire from Japanese military aeroplanes,

> which resulted in many casualties. . . . Free acts of war are still being committed by the Japanese troops. . . . All international law and international agreements have been tramped under foot"

by the East Asiatic "Boches," Japan. The pronouncement of U. S. Senator Borah against Japan that she had "violated every international law," "the Kellogg and Briand pacts, the League of Nations Covenant and the Versailles treaty," has no more than voiced the sentiments of all sane and sober-minded people in the civilized world.

Apart from Senator Borah's denunciation that "there is no justification for force in Manchuria," let us here run over the story of Japan's insidious designs and encroachments on Manchuria from 1894 onward.

It was from the lethargic and putrefied Manchu-Chinese government and officials that Japan wrenched Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur in 1894-5 as easily, to the surprise of the whole world, as snatching away candies from toddles and kiddies. Japan would have gleefully retained possession of the territory; "but Russia, with the aid of her allies, France and Germany, brought such a weight of international pressure to bear upon us (Japan) that we were forced at the cannon's mouth" to disgorge of the booty. Russia, France and Germany objected to Japan's retention on the ground that it "would endanger the peace of the Far East."

Out of Japan's frying-pan Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur, in fact, South Manchuria, went straightway in 1898 into Russia's fire! It certainly staggers belief how easily our Manchu-Chinese of those days could be wheedled and intimidated into signing away anything of China that an Occidental power chose to demand! Having satisfied Russia's demand, they found they had to satisfy also those of England, France, Germany and Japan; thus, with great magnanimity and generosity, they gave away, or promised to give away, large and small slices of China itself!

This spoliation of China, which would inevitably culminate in her dismemberment, was only stayed in 1899-1900 by the American statesman John Hay's advocacy of the famous "Open Door Policy" in China. But right in 1900 our Manchu-Chinese government and officials suddenly took it into their heads to free China from all foreign domination by the agency of the elementals or familiars at the beck and call of our immortal Righteous Band, "Yi-Ho-Tuan"; with the result that—well, all the world and his wife know.

Ousted from South Manchuria, Japan began to worm her way into Korea. She believed that she could win Korea's confidence and tighten her grip on Korea's throat gradu-

ally; then, while she was turning Korea into an outlet for her population, she might, by hook or by crook, be able to obtain some foothold on the west side of the Yalu River. Only she had reckoned without her host; for in time she found Russia had had enough influence over the Koreans to elbow her aside or give her a shove off back to her home, Russia had obtained from Korea valuable concessions in the upper region of Yalu, Russia had tried to get Masampo at the southern extremity of Korea, and, in short, Russia had been busy making a triangular naval base by linking Port Arthur and Masampo with Vladivostok! This was to "point a littoral as well as a symbolic dagger at the very heart of Japan," cried Japan in bitterness and alarm.

Japan began to prepare her break with the northern Colossus. She induced England in January, 1902, to sign an alliance offensive and defensive with her. "In July, 1903, we (Japan) proposed to Russia a settlement by which the question of Manchuria and Korea might be arranged amicably," which proposal Russia, naturally, turned down, since there was no "question of Manchuria and Korea" for Russia to settle with Japan, as far as Russia could see.

There came, on February 10, 1904, the rescript by the Japanese emperor declaring war against Russia, in which the following passages are worthy of notice—"The integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest concern to this Empire . . . the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm"; and "the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of China, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East," and so forth. Is it not easy to see which way the Japanese cat jumped and will jump?

A few days later Japan coerced poor Korea into signing the protocol obligating Korea to "place all confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in administration," while Japan engaged herself "in a spirit of firm friendship," to "ensure the safety and repose (Jap. humor!) of the Imperial House of Korea" and to "definitely guarantee the independence (!) and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire." In August, 1905, Japan renewed her alliance with England which "recognizes the right of Japan to take such measure . . . in Korea as she may deem proper, etc."

Russia signed the famous Treaty of Portsmouth with Japan on September 5, 1905, by which the contracting parties "mutually engage to restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria . . . with the exception of the territory above men-

tioned (the Liaotung Peninsula)"; "Russia agrees to transfer to Japan, with the consent of China, the railway line between Changchun and Port Arthur" (465 miles); and "Russia and Japan reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measure common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria." There is no use, now, to rake up again all the dust and noise raised by this high-handed, unethical and larcenous undertaking of Japan and Russia. (We must leave out Korea which Japan annexed in 1910 "in a spirit of firm friendship," and confine ourselves to South Manchuria in its relation to Japan.) Suffice it to say that Japan, in her barefaced appropriation of South Manchuria, has proved herself out-and-out the most gifted "hijacker" and racketeer rolled into one!

Dr. John Dewey (New Republic, June 30, 1920), tells us that "American ignorance secured almost universal approval for the Portsmouth Treaty with its 'Supplementary Clauses' . . . at the expense of China's rights in Manchuria. One foreign publicist in China is inclined to hold President Roosevelt responsible for China's international ills since 1905. He takes the ground that . . . the (Russ.-Jap.) war had been practically fought on Chinese territory, China should have been a party to the settlement. . . ."

Of course Japan could not and would not see the question in this light. Even years later (1910) Adachi Kinnosuke still put forward the claim that Japan had really a moral right to Manchuria, because she had, after the China-Japan War, in her first draft of the peace treaty with China, secured the concession of Port Arthur and Liaotung Peninsula." "But," retorted J. W. Jenks, "it should be remembered that when she (Japan) surrendered this claim (in 1895) she received from China a large added indemnity (30,000,000 taels), a fact which relieves China, at any rate, from obligation." (Outlook, March 11, 1911.)

Be that as it may, inasmuch as all the primitive war and peace usages, rules and principles have still been held as sanctified and inviolable, Japan can and will say and do anything to claim her "rightful spoils of victory." Might is Right; as Japan, with her Might, has never daringly questioned the Right of any Occidental power in China, so neither will any power, we may rest assured, care to call in question hers. The flimsiest claim of Right, backed by Might, will sound uncommonly loud and convincing to all ears!

No sooner had Japan and Russia signed their Portsmouth Treaty than Japan set about securing from our Manchu-Chinese government its confirmation of all arrangements

made therein in another convention with her, embodying additional concessions from China. This was still not enough. Japan tried to pin China down, by means of several secret protocols relating to Manchuria, to the suicidal promise, among others, "not to construct any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to the South Manchuria line or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of that line." For a wonder, as Tang Shaoyi had assured W. W. Willoughby ("Foreign Rights and Interests in China"), China did not sign such an agreement!

At last Japan, thanks to England's indirect support, succeeded in having South Manchuria in her grasp. By an imperial ordinance she created the year next, the South Manchurian Railway Company, together with a "governor-general of Kwantung leased territory" over the civil administration of the place; also, she authorized an extensive branching out of the "Bank of Chosen" as well as the "Oriental Colonization Company," first organized for the development of "Chosen" itself. Dr. Dewey points out thus:

> "Japan has been the heir of Russian aims and methods as well as of Russian achievements. It was Russia that evolved the technique of conquest by railway and bank. She consolidated . . . the sphere of influence politics with its favoritism and its dog-in-the-manger tactics. Russia discovered the value of police boxes as a means of insinuating semi-military and semi-civil administrative control in territory over which her legitimate claims, stretched to the utmost, were purely economic."

Our G. Z. Wood ("China vs. Japan," published N. Y. City, 1919) has hit the nail on the head when he calls to our attention that ". . . by making all Japanese consuls and railway employes subject to the direct control of the governor-general of the Kwantung leased territory, Japan has meant, and succeeded, too, to establish the web of administration in South Manchuria; by extending police rights wherever the new Japanese-controlled and Japanese-financed (which is the same thing) railways may go, Japan has manipulated to put South Manchuria virtually under Japanese control; by linking together the various railways between Korea and Manchuria, Japan has sought to obliterate the territorial difference between the two countries; . . . Her present position is that of a virtual master; her grip is tight, and her policy is not only aggressive but also exclusive."

While Japan was thus actively "colonizing" or "Japanizing" our South Manchuria, not seldom trying to creep northward to Siberia or sidle westward into Eastern Inner Mon-

golia, she strengthened the position of the "Empire builder," "by far the biggest fairy mother of Japan's activities in Manchuria" (as she called the South Manchurian Railway), by signing a convention with France (June 10, 1907), another with Russia (July 30, 1907), and by an exchange of notes with the United States (November, 1908). Now, believing "this would furnish a new outlet for her growing population," Komura was quite ready to enter into the well-known "Gentlemen's Agreement" with the American government regulating the Japanese immigration. Komura was "confident that Japanese emigration could be diverted from the Pacific Coast of the United States to these new channels. Nor was he actuated solely by economic motives. Politically and strategically, he considered it advisable, even imperative, that Japan's 'surplus' population should be planted . . . in territories close to her own confines." (Kawakami in Current History, Sept., 1929.)

From the same source we learn also that "in the last twenty years (c. 1909-1929) the Japanese have opened in Manchuria no fewer than 702 modern factories and mills, representing an investment of $150,000,000. Of these, 217 are devoted to chemical industries, 172 to food products, 109 to machinery and tools, 32 to steel, electricity and gas and 173 to miscellaneous purposes. Total Japanese investments in Manchuria were estimated at $700,000,000 in 1928." The N. Y. Times (August 18, 1927), however, quoted another estimation that "the amount of 1,300,000,000 yen represents the approximate total invested in Manchuria by the Japanese." Probably the former figure gives the estimation in American gold, while the latter its Japanese exchange.

We quite believe all this. But, all industrialization aside, what is there in her "Japanizing" process there in other respects that the Japanese may feel proud of? Precisely around 1907 the well-known English traveller, the Earl of Ronaldshay, was "wandering" in that part of the Orient. He studied and found how the "process" had worked out there, and left us a pen-picture of it in his "A Wandering Student in the Far East." Japan not being a fast worker nor a progressive people, as far as the human or social side of life is concerned, Ronaldshay's pen-picture may safely be taken as lifelike then as now. Readers should bear in mind that Japan and England had always been allies until 1922.

> "And it was here that I began to find solid foundations for a growing feeling of irritation against Japan. In Manchuria, as in Korea, the military element was undoubtedly guilty of aggressive and arbitrary behavior.

> Land was appropriated without adequate payment; buildings were taken and the rents left unpaid; the reasonable representations of the Chinese authorities were scouted and ignored. A swarm of Japanese ne'er-do-wells had hit like a flight of locusts upon the land, a host of shameless courtesans plied their trade in the open market in the broad light of the day. Dishonesty in trade, the arbitrary appropriation of property without adequate payment, the shameless flaunting of vice in the streets—all these things are cardinal sins in the eyes of the Chinese."

In connection with Japan's "shameless courtesans" see Current History for September, 1931, for a telltale article on "The Licensed Women of Japan" by a former Japanese Correspondent of the London Times. Y. H. Tseng's "History of China's Foreign Relations" (Ch. 6, p. 150) vouches the statement that

> "in Manuchuria the Japanese have a habit of establishing themselves anywhere and everywhere not opened by treaty to alien business and residence; often in their travels about the country they make troubles for nothing, to the annoyance of both natives and foreigners. A certain Occidental gentleman says that the chief complaint, equally from the Chinese and foreigners, against Japan is that her military—officers, soldiers and police—in Manchuria too often aid and abet their own nationals in insulting other people and act simply like wild beasts."

Since the days of Ronaldshay South Manchuria has been turned by Japan into a distributing center of her opium and morphia traffic in China. "Japanese drug stores throughout China," the oldest English daily "North China Daily News" informs the world, "carry large stocks of morphia. Japanese medicine vendors look to morphia for their largest profits. Wherever Japanese are predominant there the trade flourishes. . . . Everywhere it is sold by Japanese under exterritorial protection." All such things show why Japan is reluctant to relinquish her extraterritorial rights in China.

Between 1907 and 1910 Japan demonstrated her "dog-in-the-manger tactics" in Manchuria. It will be remembered that in September, 1905, E. H. Harriman, the American capitalist, railroad magnate and dreamer of a "Round-the-World" transportation system, approached the Japanese statesmen Ito and Katsura with the proposal that the South Manchurian Railway should be financed by an American loan and operated under joint Japanese and American direction. It was blocked insuperably by Komura. However Harri-

man, availing himself of a proposal of Russia during 1906-1907 to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to American bankers, conceived the idea of forming an international syndicate to repurchase both the Russian and the Japanese portions of the line on China's behalf. Tang Shaoyi was in Washington in 1908. Harriman discussed his scheme with Tang who expressed the opinion that China would be glad to cooperate. An important Japanese financier, on being advised informally of the scheme, responded that Japan would be unwilling to acquiesce therein.

Again, in the fall of 1907 the English contractors, Pauling and Company, signed with the Manchurian authorities a contract for the construction of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Line. Japan protested on the ground that its construction would violate the provisions of the "Secret Protocol" attached to the Komura Convention of 1905, which, as we have seen, never existed with us since China did not agree to or sign them.

Then Tang Shaoyi signed a Memorandum of Agreement in the summer of 1908 for a loan of $20,000,000, to be taken up by American capitalists for the establishment of a bank as the financial agent of the Manchurian administration for development work.

Next, around May or June, 1909, the American financial group having been organized, the Pauling and Company in conjunction with this group entered into a preliminary agreement with the viceroy of Manchuria for the construction of another line, the Chinchou-Aigun Railway. At the same time, when Harriman was approaching the Russian financial minister Kokovtseff with his project of purchasing the Chinese Eastern Railway, the American Secretary of State Philander Knox, as a means of checking Japan, advanced his scheme of neutralization of the Manchurian Railways, which virtually brought a hornets' nest about his ears.

It was but natural that Japan, as well as the Czarist Russia, scowled at such, to them, impossible proposals; for just about this time (September, 1909) Japan had secured from the moribund Manchu-Chinese government half a dozen important concessions in South Manchuria. Early in 1910 both Japan and Russia politely declined to join in the "Neutralization" scheme. Thus the schemes of Harriman and Philander Knox, which were but one and the same, fell to the ground.

Japan and Russia lost little time in further protecting their own interests in Manchuria and in warning off any other international meddlers. By a Convention signed, July 4, 1910, between themselves, "each . . . engages to maintain and respect the status quo in Manchuria resulting from the treaties, conventions, and other arrangements concluded up to this day between Japan and Russia, or between

either of those two Powers and China." And on July 13, 1911, Japan renewed her alliance with England for the second time.

It still remains quite fresh in the memories of most of us how Japan, flinging aside all diplomatic etiquette on January 18, 1915, launched her thunderbolt on China under Yuan Shih-kai's government. I refer to the notorious "21 Demands" of Japan. Out of those seven "Demands" related to South Manchuria and Eastern (Inner) Mongolia, which, to give the whole thing in a nutshell, would amount to a more or less unconditional cession of those territories to Japan; at best, they would establish an *Imperium in Imperio* therein, similar to the foreign concession at Shanghai, Macao, the "Legation Quarter" in Peiping, and a number of others which our Manchu-Chinese have bequeathed us. Under whatever form of government, Monarchical or Republican, the sovereign people of China have ever refused to recognize any such absurd and criminal "Demands" of Japan. Though Yuan Shih-kai's government agreed on May 25, 1915, to extend the lease to Japan of Port Arthur and Dairen as well as the South Manchurian Railway to 99 years, we have never regarded such an agreement as at all valid or binding. At the Paris Conference of 1918-19 we contested against those demands futilely; at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 we fought to cast them to the junk-pile, together with all the concessions and special privileges enjoyed by foreign nations and aliens in China. All the results accomplished, so far as touching upon South Manchuria, are, outside of a "Nine-Power Open-Door Treaty," the following modifications Japan was willing to make:

1. Japan is ready to throw open to the international consortium the right of option, granted exclusively to Japanese capital, to loan for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
2. Japan will not exercise her preferential rights in questions concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military and police matters in South Manchuria.

A spokesman of the Japanese delegation, referring to South Manchuria, brazenly remarked that Japan has ever considered it "a region where, by reason of its close propinquity to Japan's territory more than anything else, Japan has vital interests in all that relates to her economic life and national safety." So has a poor bandit ever considered an old millionaire living next door "a man of whom, by reason of his close propinquity to the bandit's diggings more than anything else, the bandit has vital interests in all that relates to his economic life and personal safety!"

Hence, though our Delegates had talked till their faces became black and though China had succeeded in placing on record her unchanging view regarding the "21 Demands," Japan came away from the Conference in triumph and found her position in South Manchuria (and Eastern Inner Mongolia!) exactly where it had been. Did not the flimsiest claim of Right, backed by Might, sound uncommonly loud and convincing to all ears?

With warranted insolence did Japan return to South Manchuria. From 1922 to 1927 Japanese offenses and outrages, serious or trifling, against the local Chinese officials and people—men, women, even boys—were almost of daily occurrence. Needless to say, the losers by and victims of the rapacity, ferocity and brutality of the Japanese were invariably the Chinese; only rarely were the citizens or subjects of other Occidental nations annoyed or insulted. All such cases are on Chinese record or can be unearthed from the files of Chinese and foreign newspapers for those years. Space only forbids me to quote any instance here.

In November or thereabout, 1927, Japan's new premier Tanaka abruptly made the announcement that his government would inaugurate more "positive" policies, both in domestic and foreign relations. He stated his determination "to coordinate the administrative arrangements of Japan in Manchuria. Diplomatic and military matters were to be more closely correlated, the civil governor was to confine his supervision to local administration, while the railway directorate was to become a quasi-governmental agency, similar in nature to the old British East India Company or the existing British South Africa Company, and act as the principal representative of the Japanese government in Manchuria." He also announced: "Japan's China Policy . . . will in future attach greater importance to local Chinese Government. Greater stress will be laid on the importance of maintaining Japan's special position in Manchuria and Mongolia." Our Nanking Press Bureau at the time asserted that all the evidences of the Japanese premier's program revealed "emphatically that the Japanese government under Tanaka's régime is audacious enough to regard Manchuria as Japan's exclusive colony and that the next step for Japan to take would be the seizure of Manchuria and a part of Mongolia."

American press announced on September 17, 1927, that Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co. sailed for Japan, and on October 4 that he made an address at the Tokio Bankers' Club. Therefore it was not altogether unexpected that soon after an American loan to the South Manchurian Railway Company was bruited about. On November 23, 1927, a group of our influential financiers and business men cabled to our Minister at Washington requesting him to pre-

sent to the American Secretary of State Kellogg and the American people their resolution opposing any such loans to the Japanese organization. Our Wai-Chiao-Pu in Peking, too, wired our Ministers at Washington and Tokio on November 30 for the terms and other details of the loan; besides, a formal protest was lodged with the American government.

The New Republic (December 7, 1927) says of this rumored loan of $40,000,000 to Japan on the security of the South Manchurian Railway: "J. P. Morgan and Company seem to be lending money not on one of the assets of the Japanese government, but on one of its gravest political liabilities."

Harrangued The Nation (December 14, 1927): "To lend money to such an organization, in the present inflammable state of the Far East, is almost an act of war. It is an insult to China and a provocation to Russia. . . . Whatever the State Department and Mr. Lamont may say, such a loan will be regarded in Japan, China, and Russia as notice to the world that the United States supports the new 'positive policy' of Japan in Manchuria. . . . He (Lamont) and his firm owe it to their country to drop the South Manchurian loan."

It seems the lower house of the Japanese Diet was not in sympathy with Tanaka's "positive policy." Tanaka dissolved it on January 21, 1928, in anticipation of a general election to be held on February 20 under the manhood suffrage law. As its platform Seiyukai (Tanaka's party) reasserted its so-called "positive policy" of government aid to finance and industry and protection of rights in China. Before his dissolution of the lower house Tanaka reasserted the doctrine of "special interest" (recognized by the Lansing-Ishii understanding of 1917) as to Manchuria and Mongolia: "With reference to Manchuria and Mongolia, especially the three eastern provinces (i.e., Manchuria), we are inclined to think that, in view of their peculiar historical and geographical relations to this country, it may be necessary for us to take these provinces into special consideration. The Japanese government hopes that these particular provinces will always be kept in good order as a land for the safe and peaceful habitation of Chinese and foreigners alike, and that they will attain proper economic development. Animated by this desire, the maintenance of peace and order there is the object of their constant attention."

But this "positive policy" the Seiyukai government had to curtail somewhat, because $74,000,000 were cut from the original budget in a new budget introduced at a special session. In the meantime all the Japanese government could do was to attempt prevention of the Manchurian Govern-

ment from connecting the Peking-Mukden Railway with the new Chinese Mukden-Hailung line east of the South Manchuria line; while in China Japan delivered on May 18 a copy of her memorandum each to the Peking Government under Chang Tso-lin and the Nanking Government under Chiang Kai-shek, which in effect declared the neutrality of Manchuria under Japanese military protection.

The Nanking Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in reply, rebuked Japan in these words:

> "The Nationalist Government, in view of the commercial importance of the three Eastern Provinces and the large number of foreign nationals resident in them, will take proper and satisfactory measures for the maintenance of peace and order, so that both Chinese and foreigners may enjoy full protection. This responsiility rests solely with the Nationalist Government. . . .
> "These measures (announced as contemplated by Japan) not only constitute interference in China's domestic affairs, but also a flagrant violation of the principle of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty. Such measures the Nationalist Government can never recognize. It is the earnest hope of the Nationalist Government that the Japanese government . . . will avoid actions that would impair the development of amicable relations."

Nevertheless Japan played a clownish role, rushed thousands of her soldiers to China as well as Manchuria, and, in conjunction with four or five other foreign nations, made enough turmoil to set East Asia on fire!

Chang Tso-lin beat on June 3 an orderly retreat back to Mukden. Very early the next morning, about 6:30, as Chang's train approached Mukden, there was a terrific explosion which wrecked the whole train; and the great "Dictator" died a few hours after. Bertram Lenox Simpson, well-known English author under the pen-name "Putnam Weale," after having made a painstaking investigation on the spot, declared that the Japanese "Black Dragon," a society of gunmen, was responsible for this bombing and murder. About August 15 he sent to Tokio through Japan's representative in Peking a copy of his "sleuthing" findings and charges. Thomas F. Millard, in his article "Did Japan Kill Chang Tso-lin?" (Nation, December 12, 1928), made it quite clear that only Japanese could be guilty of such a "killing." The whole Chinese nation has been quite sure of it.

After this Japan exerted herself in every way possible (a) to isolate Manchuria on the one hand and (b) to bar Chinese army and authority from advancing into Manchuria on the other. We shall say nothing about the latter move

of the Japanese, but about their activities in Manchuria let the cloud of newspaper reports and magazine articles be summarized.

Being strongly and bitterly anti-Japanese and perfectly sure that Japan would, if she could, repeat the story of Korea in Manchuria, the Manchurians decided to let Chang Hsueh-liang succeed his father as Governor. The Nanking Government made pacific overtures to Mukden and sent a deputation there which was well received. An agreement was reached by which Manchuria would recognize Nanking's authority under certain conditions and would raise the Nationalist flag in the Eastern Provinces. The agreement was to be promulgated on July 21.

On July 20 the Japanese consul Hayashi informed Chang his government strongly advised the Mukden Government not to proceed with its agreement to affiliate with the Nanking Government, and added that, if Japan's views were disregarded, the Japanese government would take steps to preserve the status quo. Japan began to dispose her soldiers at Mukden, outside the railway zone and the Japanese town in proximity to the aviation field and the arsenal. In reply the Mukden Government intimated that it would proceed with its purpose to recognize the Nationalist Government of China, though it postponed the promulgation of the agreement and the raising of the Nationalist flag.

Japan sent Gonsuke Hayashi, her former ambassador to England, to Mukden and notified Chang that Japan has decided against a reconciliation between Manchuria and Nationalist China and will prevent it even if it should have to interfere in China's internal affairs. Gonsuke also said that Japan disapproved of Manchuria's reunion with China because the internal condition of Nationalist China was far from settled and bore a "reddish" taint. He insisted that the Mukden Government should make an agreement confirming and extending Japan's special position and rights in Manchuria. Chang flatly refused to make any such agreement or to remain independent of Nationalist China. All the promise Gonsuke succeeded in extracting from Chang was that, as suggested by Japan, Mukden would wait three months before taking further action in the matter.

Japan had deluded herself with the belief that "young Chang" vis-a-vis Japan would be like wax. "Young Chang's" stubbornness must have come as a great surprise to the Tanaka government. Chang fulfilled his promise to wait three months, at the end of which he had the old flag replaced by the new Nationalist flag all over Manchuria. Reports from Mukden and elsewhere in Manchuria indicated that the change of flags was attended by great popular rejoicing. Chang and all principal officials of Manchuria wired their allegiance to the Nanking Government and announced

the appointment of Nationalist Political Councils in the three Eastern Provinces and in Jehol, Central Mongolia. Foreign Minister C. T. Wang declared that Manchuria's action showed that outside attempts to coerce the Chinese Nationalist movement were doomed to failure.

Millard's fear that "Chang Tso-lin's death would open a way for the promotion of Japan's policy vis-a-vis China and Manchuria" was, therefore, not realized most unexpectedly. Instead it did "open a way" for the "out" of the Seiyukai government of Japan!

For some time Japanese growing Liberalism had been eyeing the government's actions with disgust and dissatisfaction, especially its "blundering sword-rattling policy in China." "Public opinion," we were informed from several directions (Curr. Hist. Aug., 1929), "was against the Tanaka régime, and was for a more liberal China policy." The Japanese liberals had instituted an official investigation into the bombing of Chang Tso-lin. The resultant report, though not published, threw Tokio into an uproar and recommended the punishment of Colonel Kawamoto, officer in charge of the Japanese soldiers guarding the South Manchurian Railway, and other military officers of high rank. On July 1 the Japanese War Office announced that Kawamoto and the other officers would be punished. The next day Tanaka and his cabinet resigned.

The new Hamaguchi government was professedly liberal, with Kijuro Shidehara in charge of Japan's foreign relations. It was generally believed that, under his handling, Japan would resume a policy of conciliation toward and non-interference in China, which has been regarded as more successful than Tanaka's "positive" policy. Premier Hamaguchi issued on July 9 a statement of his Minseito party which was conciliatory toward China, declaring the renunciation of all aggressive measures against any part of China's territory and advocating mutual understanding and economic cooperation. The Mukden Government began to ask Japan's acquiescence in a linking-up of Kirin-Hailung and Mukden-Hailung lines, built with Chinese money, with the Chinese Kirin-Changchun and Kirin-Tunhua lines, built with Japanese funds, against which the Japanese hold mortgages.

Japan sent Eichi Kimura, director of the South Manchurian Railway, to Mukden on December 12 to discuss outstanding railway issues with Chang Hsueh-liang. The official statement was that Japan would make no demands opposing the building of parallel lines but would seek a working agreement to the end that Chinese and Japanese lines might have equal treatment and compete on equal terms.

There could be no question that, if Japan could abandon her project of "Koreanizing" our Manchuria, would relinquish her extraterritorial rights in China, or, at least, could prevent her military from acting "independently," from wantonly perpetrating all sorts of offenses against the native Chinese, her policy of conciliation would in time bring the Manchurian Government and Japan to a "working agreement" satisfactory to both sides. As it has been, Japan's conciliatary policy is a mere gesture and has been adopted to little avail. China has been stirred up by an intense spirit of nationalism just then as now; China in her relations with foreign nations demands something more substantial from them than a mere gesture; China can no longer be satisfied with soothing words and sweet promises from any foreign power. Not the soothing words and sweet promises of Japan by any means; for China has learned since about 1874 downward that Japan has ever been a past-master in chicane, artifice, maneuver, circumvention and prevarication, strengthened by lies, black or white, right and left.

After all, Japan is not "backward" only in respect of material "civilization" which she has copied faithfully from the Occident. Her own nature, mentality, hopes, dreams as well as her Welt-politik are still way back in the period from the 16th century to the early 19th. Her Liberalism is but of very recent growth, of which her Samurai spirit and Jingoism have up to the present never ceased trying to get the upper hand.

It followed thus that her liberal party had taken the helm barely sixteen months when her premier Hamaguchi was shot down (November 14, 1930) by a member of Aikokusha, a reactionary organization of "patriots." Foreign minister Shidehara, acting as premier, took care to address both houses of the Diet regarding Manchuria on January 22, 1931, in these words: "It is needless to say that we have no intention of seeking anything like unfair and selfish terms in disregard of China's legitimate position. Nor can it be believed that China on her part harbors a design to reduce the South Manchurian Railway to ruin." Indeed, we are far from harboring such a design; but how Japan's Diet took Shidehara's assurance we are not given to understand.

In April Reijiro Wakatsuki succeeded Hamaguchi as premier and announced his intention of maintaining the Hamaguchi policies. Y. Uchida, signer of the Kellogg-Briand pact at Paris, was appointed president of the South Manchurian Railway and believed to be in close accord with Shidehara in his policy of reaching a conciliatory settlement of outstanding Manchurian issues with China. All this

looked highly roseate; but Japan's governing body forgot her military, Jingoism and "patriots."

Around May a report was handed about in China that the Japanese residents of Manchuria had started an "independent movement" and held in Mukden a meeting attended by 1,500 Japanese from several Manchurian localities, at which a movement was launched to accomplish three objects:

(1) The organization of all Japanese in Manchuria into a single society;
(2) the protection of Japanese rights and privileges in Manchuria;
(3) the direction of Japan's policy in Manchuria.

At the meeting Japan's conciliatory attitude toward China was denounced and criticism was voiced of Chinese measures designed to regain complete control of the northeastern provinces.

In this meeting and this organization, as many can see, there projected a forecast of new measures designed to "provoke an open conflict between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria." The "devil did appear," and not so very long after, as evidenced by the occurrences narrated in the opening paragraphs of this succinct account of the Japanese "Manchuria-Hunger" since twenty-seven years ago.

Kinnosuké says in his "Manchuria" (1925): "The question of war or peace for Japan will be settled, not in Japan, nor on the Pacific, . . . but in Manchuria. . . . Japan is about to find in Manchuria the source of life and national peace. For of all the thousand troubles Japan has, two are serious: The lack of food and the lack of vital materials. . . . And Manchuria seems to be the answer to a large extent." Fukishi, a Japanese general, who accompanied Gonsuke Hayashi to Mukden to warn Chang Hsueh-liang, said on returning to Tokio: "Manchuria is Japan's daughter and our first line of defense."

All such are no startling revelations. Many a publicist has known and voiced them for some time. But there is one angle of the question no one seems to see or, perhaps, cares to speak about, which is that, should Japan make herself such an international nuisance in the Far East, all or many hands might be up against her; in that case, Manchuria might prove Japan's Waterloo; or, if worse comes to worst, she might find herself in the position of "Kaiserlich Deutschland" about the outskirts of the Continent of Asia!

(The end.)